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ABSTRACT
SHOULD CORPORATE BOND TRADING BE CENTRALIZED?
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Se´bastien Plante
Joao Gomes
This paper shows that centralizing the US corporate bond market would yield large gains
in efficiency. By studying two markets where corporate bonds are successfully traded on
central limit order books, I estimate that the transaction costs of US corporate bonds would
decrease by 70% on average if trading migrated from over-the-counter markets to limit
order markets. To study the social value of reforming the corporate bond market, I build
a parsimonious model of centralized and decentralized trading. The model implies that the
optimal market structure can be determined by appropriately scaling the transaction costs
associated with each market structure. Estimating the scaling factors reveals that moving
to limit order markets would generate a social surplus equal to 21 bps of total par value.
Large bond issues with low credit ratings and long time to maturity would benefit the most.
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CHAPTER 1 : Empirical Evidence
1.1. Introduction
In the US, corporate bond transactions are intermediated by dealers in decentralized over-
the-counter (OTC) markets. Unlike US equities, which are largely traded in transparent
central limit order books (CLOB), corporate bonds are traded in fragmented markets with
little pre-trade transparency since dealer quotations are not consolidated and publicly avai-
lable. It is often suggested that the opaqueness associated with this market structure is
responsible for the lack of liquidity and high transaction costs of corporate bonds (see for
example Biais and Green (2007), Harris (2015), and Harris, Kyle, and Sirri (2015)).
How efficient is the current market structure? Should corporate bonds instead be traded
in centralized limit order markets, just like US equities are? Would mandated changes
regarding the consolidation and disclosure of quotes improve liquidity? Given the impor-
tance of the $9 trillion US corporate bond market as a source of capital formation, these
questions have captured the interest of policymakers, practitioners, and academics alike.
For example, when speaking about the role of the SEC in the fixed-income market, former
SEC Commissioner Gallagher (2015) said, “At the Commission level, there has been a lot
of discussion about issues such as enhanced pre and post trade transparency . . . For
example, the Commission should be looking at all options for facilitating electronic and
on exchange transactions.” At this point, however, there is no consensus on whether a
centralized market structure would actually improve the liquidity of corporate bonds.
Several market participants and observers are skeptical about the viability of a centralized
market structure, for at least three reasons. A first argument is that corporate bonds are
primarily illiquid because investors don’t need to trade them often. As a result, monitoring
and updating firm quotes would be too costly and centralized venues would fail to attract
competing limit orders. A second argument is that corporate bonds are mostly traded by
large institutions that would not find the liquidity they need on a CLOB. A third argument
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is that the sheer number of bond issues, and their bespoke contractual features, make
them unsuitable for centralized trading.1. In other words, the concern is that bonds are
intrinsically illiquid such that changing the market structure would not improve market
quality.
Other observers have a more positive outlook. For example, Harris, Kyle, and Sirri (2015)
make the case for a centralized corporate bond market and suggest, “The US Securities
and Exchange commission (SEC) could rapidly and substantially improve bond market effi-
ciency by simply requiring brokers to post their customers’ limit orders to an electronically
accessible broker platform or alternative trading system (ATS), where one customer’s limit
order could trade against another customer’s order without dealer intermediation.” Their
argument is supported by the successful implementation of comparable market reforms on
the Nasdaq in 1997, a market that operated in a similar way as the modern US corporate
bond market. In summary, the merits of a centralized market structure for corporate bonds
are still being debated.
Surprisingly, given the importance of the issue for policy, I am not aware of any study that
quantifies whether a centralized market structure would be more efficient than the current
OTC structure. This paper fills that gap and makes two main contributions. First, by
studying two markets where corporate bonds trade successfully on central limit order books,
I estimate that transaction costs would decrease by 70% on average if US bonds traded on
similar venues. This implies that, over the life of a bond, investors would on average save
the equivalent of 0.66% of a bond’s total par value in transaction costs. Second, I evaluate
the welfare implications of centralizing the market structure through the lens of a structural
model and obtain large and positive estimates. For the average bond, a benevolent social
planner would spend up to 21 bps of total par value to migrate trading to centralized venues.
In the cross-section of bonds, I document that larger issues with lower credit ratings and
longer time to maturity would benefit the most.
1These arguments are frequently mentioned in the financial press, see for example Childs (2014), Ng and
Grind (2012), and BIS (2014)
2
To construct counterfactual transaction cost estimates, I rely on evidence from the Israeli
market and the early 20th century US market where corporate bonds are/were successfully
traded on exchange. In Israel, corporate bonds have been actively traded on the CLOB of
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange for several decades. Abudy and Wohl (2017) and Protnick and
Gur-Gershgoren (2011) discuss the institutional setting of this market. In order to measure
the liquidity of Israeli bonds and stocks, I obtain trade and quotation data from the Tel
Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE).2 In the first half of the century, US corporate bonds were
also actively traded on exchange, most prominently on the NYSE. Biais and Green (2007)
provide a detailed account of the microstructure of the US bond market in the 20th century
and document the demise of exchange trading in the mid to late 1940s. In order to measure
the liquidity of US bonds and stocks in the early 20th century, I hand collect historical data
on quotation, volume, and security characteristics for a large number of securities from 1917
to 1921.
The evidence from these two markets reveals that exchange traded corporate bonds have
similar, if not lower, transaction costs than equities. This observation holds both uncondi-
tionally and after controlling for known determinants of the bid-ask spread, such as trading
volume and return volatility. In contrast, corporate bond transaction costs in the modern
US market are several times larger than equity transaction costs.
In order to estimate the transaction costs that modern US corporate bonds would have on a
centralized venue, I propose an estimator based on equity transaction costs and observable
bond characteristics. I test the accuracy of the equity-implied estimator in the Israeli and
historical US markets, where estimated and measured transaction costs can be compared.
In both samples, equity-implied and measured transaction costs are highly correlated, and
the equity-implied estimates are on average larger than measured transaction costs. As a
result, applying the estimator to modern US bonds provides a conservative estimate of how
much transaction costs would decrease if trades were centralized. The estimates suggests
2I am indebted to Avi Wohl for helping me gain access to this data.
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that transaction costs would decrease by 70% relative to their current OTC levels.
While obtaining these counterfactual transaction cost estimates is informative, the exercise
does not allow us to conclude that a centralized market structure would be more efficient.
Indeed, transaction costs are wealth transfers between liquidity providers and liquidity see-
kers, not deadweight losses. To estimate the social value of centralizing the market struc-
ture, I build a parsimonious model of centralized and decentralized trading that delivers, in
closed-form, a formula for the relative efficiency of the two market structures. This is done
by adapting the seminal framework of decentralized trading introduced by Duffie, Garleanu,
and Pedersen (2005) (DGP) in such a way that both market structures can be represented
in the same economic environment.
As in DGP, the decentralized market structure is modeled as a request for quote trading
procedure, where finding counterparties is time consuming and subject to search frictions.
Upon contact, bargaining between customers and dealers determines transaction prices.
These modeling assumptions are in line with the institutional setting of the modern US
corporate bond market; in practice, customers must often sequentially contact dealers and
negotiate over the terms of trade. The main departure from the original DGP framework has
to do with the market participation of investors and market makers.3 Instead of assuming
exogenous measures of investors and market makers, I model their endogenous and dynamic
participation.4 Remarkably, enriching the DGP framework with endogenous participation
delivers a tractable model that can be solved in closed form solution, both in and out of
steady state. More importantly, the modified framework can seamlessly be adapted to
model centralized trading.
3I also bring a few technical modifications to the original DGP setup: I replace the increasing return to
scale matching function with a constant return to scale matching function, and abstract from the interdealer
market.
4In Section 7, DGP study an economy were dealers make a static decision on the intensity of their market
making activity and abide by it. They write, ”A full dynamic analysis of the optimal control of market making
intensities with small switching costs would be interesting, but seems difficult.” The modified framework
presented here provides a tractable way to model the dynamic liquidity provision of buy-side investors and
sell-side dealers.
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The centralized market structure is modeled as a limit order book, where liquidity provi-
ders post executable quotes that are publicly observable. Despite the transparency of the
centralized venue, trades are not executed instantly. In practice, concerns related to price
impact lead investors to split and execute their orders over time. For example, Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988) show that strategic liquidity traders may delay the execution of their
orders to minimize transaction costs. The model accommodates these frictions through a
trade processing function that induces delays in order execution. Formally, I model the
decentralized market structure within a random search framework, as in DGP, while the
centralized market structure is modeled within a directed search framework, in the spirit
of Moen (1997) and Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015). Beside the difference in trading
procedure, the economic environment is identical in the two versions of the model.
From a quantitative perspective, the interest of the model lies in the simple and intuitive
formulas it delivers to evaluate the relative efficiency of the two market structures. Spe-
cifically, the model implies that the difference between welfare on the centralized market
structure, W c, and welfare on the decentralized market structure, W d, is proportional to
W c −W d ∝ S
d
θm
− S
c
βc
, (1.1)
where Sd and Sc are the respective round-trip transaction costs on the decentralized and
centralized venues, and θm and β
c are the shares of trade surplus that accrue to market
makers on the decentralized and centralized venues, respectively.
The welfare formula highlights that comparing transaction costs is not sufficient to deter-
mine which market structure is optimal. To compare efficiency, transaction costs must be
scaled by the fractions of trade surplus that accrue to market makers, θm and β
c. Intuitively,
transaction costs are the product of two components. The first one is related to the degree
of trading frictions, and is relevant for efficiency: trading costs are larger when the asset is
difficult to trade, and more frictions in the trading process generates misallocations which
are costly from a social perspective. The second component is related to the fraction of
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trade surplus that market makers extract, which corresponds to a wealth transfer, and isn’t
relevant for efficiency. In order to compare efficiency, transaction costs must be adjusted to
reflect the effect of the later component. Section 2.2 formalizes this intuition.
Since the current transaction costs of US corporate bonds, Sd, can directly be measured in
the data, and since the equity-implied estimator provides counterfactual estimates for Sc,
we are left to estimate the two remaining parameters, θm and β
c. The estimation indicates
that market makers extract a larger share of surplus on over-the-counter markets, θˆm > βˆ
c,
such that transaction costs must decrease by at least 39% of their OTC level for a centralized
market structure to be optimal. Estimating the proportionality constant in equation (1.1),
I find that a social planner would pay up to 21 bps of total par value on average to migrate
trading to centralized venues. In the cross-section of bonds, larger issues with lower credit
ratings and longer time to maturity would benefit the most.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 1.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 constructs the equity-implied estimates. Section
2.2 introduces the model and derives the welfare formula. Section 2.3 estimates the welfare
implications. Section 2.4 concludes.
1.2. Related Literature
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on corporate bond liquidity by providing
counterfactual estimates of the transaction costs that corporate bonds would have on limit
order markets. This paper also contributes to market structure theory by building an
empirically tractable framework that delivers a simple formula to evaluate the relative
efficiency of centralized and decentralized market structures.
1.2.1. Empirical Literature
Several papers have studied the transaction costs of modern US corporate bonds. The
salient findings are that transaction costs are high, particularly for small orders; and that
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the implementation of TRACE, which introduced some level of post-trade transparency, has
reduced transaction costs for all trade sizes (Schultz (2001), Bessembinder, Maxwell, and
Ventakaraman (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, S., and R. (2007)).
The observation that small orders receive worst prices is usually attributed to the ability of
OTC dealers to extract rents from less sophisticated investors. The impact of TRACE on
transaction costs suggests that post-trade transparency has been beneficial to investors.
Using a proprietary dataset of intraday quotations, Harris (2015) finds many instances
of trade-through – i.e., trades occurring outside the quoted spread – suggesting that the
market would likely benefit from additional pre-trade transparency and price protection
rules. O’Hara, Wang, and Zhou (2017) and Hendershott, Li, Livdan, and Schurhoff (2017)
find that smaller and less active insurance companies systematically receive worst execution
prices relative to more active insurance companies, suggesting that dealers can extract rents
from less active investors. Hendershott and Madhavan (2015) study the transaction costs
of corporate bond orders executed on MarketAxess’s electronic platform. Although this
platform also operates on a request for quote basis, the venue allows customers to contact
multiple dealers at once which they show reduce transaction costs. They argue that such
venues might pave the way toward centralized and continuous trading.
Biais and Declerck (2007) study the OTC European corporate bond market and similarly
observe that large orders obtain better prices. They also report that, for all trade sizes,
transaction costs are lower for Euro bonds than for US bonds, a finding they attribute
to fiercer competition among the dealers from different Eurozone countries. Harris and
Piwowar (2006) and Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff (2007) document similar patterns in
the US municipal bond market, another decentralized OTC market.
While these papers suggest that opaque OTC markets generate large transaction costs,
they do not address how liquid bonds would be on limit order books. One of the main
contribution of my empirical analysis is to provide such counterfactual estimates.
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A few papers have investigated the trading of corporate bonds on limit order markets.
Abudy and Wohl (2017) and Protnick and Gur-Gershgoren (2011) study the case of the
Israeli market, where corporate bonds have been traded on the CLOB of the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange for several decades. They report that, despite a relatively small market
capitalization, the Israeli corporate bond market is quite liquid. Abudy and Wohl (2017)
also show that Israeli corporate bonds are on average less expensive to trade than stocks.
Odegaard (2017) studies the liquidity of corporate bonds on the CLOB of the Oslo Stock
Exchange and also finds that corporate bonds are less expensive to trade than stocks.
Biais and Green (2007) study the historical US corporate bond market and report that,
until the late 1940s, bonds were actively traded on exchange. They document that in the
early 1940s, exchange traded bonds were fairly liquid, with transaction costs similar to their
modern OTC counterparts. They document that trading left the exchange in the late 1940s,
when insurance companies owned close to 80% of the aggregate bond market.5 Biais and
Green (2007) also document that corporate bond exchange trading never gained traction
again, despite a growing share of retail ownership in the 1970s, likely because of order flow
externalities. Once a market has captured most of the order flow, investors individually
have no incentive to deviate and submit their order to a potentially more efficient, but
currently illiquid, market.
While these papers show that, corporate bonds have been successfully traded on limit order
markets in other environments, they do not speak to how liquid would modern US bonds be
if trading were centralized today. The estimates I provide in this paper suggest that modern
US bond transaction costs would decrease significantly. Moreover, my paper contributes to
the literature by hand collecting and analyzing a novel historical dataset of US securities. I
study a sample of 76 stocks and 188 bonds from the beginning of 1917 to the end of 1921,
5Evidence from the Kimber’s Record of Insurance Company Security Purchases, dating back to 1915,
show that insurance companies traded bonds and stocks almost exclusively OTC, even when these securities
were actively traded on exchange. A possible explanation for the reluctance of insurance companies to trade
on exchange is that the NYSE had a mandated floor on broker commissions, while these commissions were
fully negotiable OTC.
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while Biais and Green (2007) study a sample of 6 bonds from the beginning of 1943 to the
end of 1947.6
1.2.2. Theoretical Literature
From a theoretical perspective, my paper is related and contributes to the literature on in-
termediated OTC markets that evolved from Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) (DGP).
7 In the original DGP framework, an exogenously specified measure of investors participate
in an OTC market where they must search for counterparties and bargain over the terms of
trade upon contact. I modify the original random search framework of DGP by modeling
the endogenous and dynamic participation of investors and market makers, while keeping
the analysis highly tractable. Importantly, the modified framework can easily be adapted
to accommodate a centralized market structure.
I model a central limit order book by substituting the random search framework of DGP for
a directed search framework. Directed search was first introduced by Moen (1997) in the
context of the labour market. Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015) apply the concepts of
directed search to model an OTC market where dealers compete for order flow by publicly
committing to firm prices.8 In this paper, directed search is used to model how orders are
handled in a central limit order book.
My paper is also related to the literature on market structure optimality. Pagano (1989)
and Rust and Hall (2003) develop models where investors choose between trading on an
exchange and searching for counterparties. Rust and Hall (2003) find that the existence
of a centralized trading venue improves welfare; Pagano (1989) obtains ambiguous welfare
implications when some of the order flow is executed off-exchange. Babus and Parlatore
6The sample of Biais and Green contains intraday transaction data; my sample consists of monthly
quotation data.
7Examples of paper who extended the original DGP framework include Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) and
Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015) who introduce heterogeneity in the framework and Lagos, Rocheteau,
and Weill (2011) who study liquidity crises in a related setup.
8In the US corporate bond market trades are typically executed well within dealer quoted spreads (Table
1.1 shows that effective spreads are about 40% the size of quoted spreads in my sample). Thus a price setting
mechanism that involves bargaining seems to provide a more accurate representation of the current trading
procedure.
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(2017) develop a model where a decentralized market structure may prevail in equilibrium,
even though a centralized market structure is optimal. Glode and Opp (2017) show that a
decentralized market structure may improve allocative efficiency by limiting harmful scree-
ning.
My paper contributes to this literature by developing a model that delivers sufficient statis-
tics for the relative efficiency of centralized and decentralized trading venues. For a survey
of the literature on sufficient statistics, see Chetty (2009).
1.3. Data
This paper studies the markets for equities and corporate bonds in three different environ-
ments: the modern US market (2013–2015), the early 20th century US market (1917–1921),
and the modern Israeli market (2013–2015). The main objective of the empirical analysis
is to obtain counterfactual estimates for the transaction costs that modern US corporate
bonds would have on limit order markets. Since these estimates are inferred from equity
transaction costs, the samples are composed of firms that have both listed equities and
publicly traded corporate bonds.
Data availability dictates the time coverage of my samples. The Israeli data I have access
to covers the period 2013–2015, thus for comparability I select the same time period for the
modern US sample. The early 20th century data must be collected manually from sources
publicly available up to the end of 1921. I choose to collect data for the last five years
available since this is when the cross sectional coverage is the most comprehensive.
Table 1.1 contains relevant descriptive statistics for the transaction costs and general cha-
racteristics of the securities included in my three samples. The attributes of the samples
are compared and contrasted below.
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1.3.1. Modern US Market
Despite a large number of active market centers, trading in listed US equities is quite
centralized. The bids and offers from all trading venues are consolidated in real time to form
the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO), which contains the highest bid and the lowest
offer across all market centers. In addition, the price priority of the NBBO is enforced
market wide: the order protection rule of Regulation NMS ensures that investors receive
an execution price at least as good as the standing NBBO. For a detailed account of US
equities trading environment, see Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011) and Angel, Harris, and
Spatt (2015).
To measure the liquidity of US equities, I obtain intraday trade and quotation data from the
daily TAQ database. This database contains a complete history of all trades and quotations
in listed equities time-stamped to the millisecond. The transaction data include execution
prices and quantities; the quotation data include quoted bid and ask, as well as the quantities
offered. This high frequency data is complemented with security level characteristics from
CRSP.
Unlike equities, nearly all US corporate bonds transactions are executed on decentralized
over-the-counter markets offering little pre-trade transparency. While some dealers adver-
tise their quotes on electronic platforms such as Bloomberg and Tradeweb, these quotes
are often simply indicative and used as the starting point of negotiations. Even when exe-
cutable quotes are advertised, there is no systematic effort to consolidate and disseminate
the information. Although pre-trade transparency is quite limited, the market offers some
degree of post-trade transparency since transactions are disseminated through the TRACE
database within 15 minutes of execution.
To measure the liquidity of US corporate bonds, I obtain intraday transaction data from
the enhanced TRACE database. As opposed to the standard version of the database, the
enhanced version reports uncensored trade sizes, which allows for accurate computation of
11
trading volume. End of day corporate bond quotations are from Bloomberg. The trade and
quotation data is complemented with bond characteristics data from Mergent FISD.
To be admissible in the sample in a given year, a security must: be covered by CRSP or
Mergent FISD, have an amount outstanding of at least 50 million dollars, have an annual
trading volume of at least 2 million dollars, and have enough quotation midpoints to com-
pute at least 40 daily returns. Convertible bonds are excluded from the sample. The final
sample is composed of all the admissible securities issued by firms that have an admissible
common stock listed and at least one admissible corporate bond issue. The final sample is
composed of 457 firms that collectively have 1,801 bonds outstanding. The equity sample
contains 5.5 billion transactions and 110 billion intraday quotes, while the corporate bond
sample contains 2.5 million transactions and 0.4 million end of day quotes.
Using the trade and quotation data, I compute two annual measures of liquidity: the quoted
spread and the effective spread. For stocks, the quoted spread at time t is defined as
quoted spreadt =
At −Bt
Mt
, (1.2)
where At and Bt are the respective best ask and bid standing at time t, and Mt is the
average of Bt and At or midpoint. For a given stock in a given year, the quoted spread is
defined as the time-weighted average of quoted spreadt over the year. The effective spread
for a given transaction k is defined as
effective spreadk = 2
∣∣∣∣Pk −MkMk
∣∣∣∣ , (1.3)
where Pk is the price of the k
th transaction, Mk is the standing midpoint at the time of
the transaction. For a given stock in a given year, the effective spread is defined as the
dollar-volume-weighted average of effective spreadk over the year.
These two liquidity measures must be defined slightly differently for corporate bonds since
quotations are only observed at a daily frequency. For a given bond in a given year, the
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annual measure of quoted spread is defined as the simple average of end-of-day quoted
spread over the year. The annual effective spread measure is computed as the dollar-
volume-weighed average of the transaction level effective spreads calculated as in (1.3),
where the closing mid point of the previous day is used for Mk.
The first two columns of Table 1.1 present descriptive statistics for the modern US sample.
The first two rows show that the transaction costs of US corporate bonds are several times
larger than those of equities: the average quoted and effective spreads are respectively 0.56%
and 0.23% for bonds, compared to 0.09% and 0.07% for equities. This is striking since the
standard deviation of equity returns (32%) is on average several times larger than the
standard deviation of bond returns (5%), and volatility is known to be positively associated
with transaction costs. On the other hand, the corporate bond market is thinner than
the equity market, which could arguably explain their high transaction costs: the average
equity (bond) issue has a market capitalization of 22.3 (0.7) billion dollars, a daily trading
volume of 130.38 (2.11) million dollars and an annual turnover of 268% (86%). The lower
trading activity of the bond market is often argued to be the reason why corporate bonds
are not suitable for centralized trading. I provide evidence against this view in the next two
subsections.
The corporate bonds in my sample have standard characteristics. The average bond was
issued with 12 years to maturity, and has 8 years left until maturity. Callable debt is the
norm with 96% of the bond having the feature. About one-fifth of the bonds are secured.
None of the bonds have sinking funds or CPI indexation clauses. In terms of credit ratings,
71% of the bonds are investment grade (IG), 20% are high yield (HY), and the remaining
9% are not rated (NR).
1.3.2. Israeli Market
In Israel, corporate bonds are actively traded on exchange along with equities on the Tel-
Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), the only exchange in the country. Abudy and Wohl (2017)
13
show that only 6% of the aggregate trading volume in corporate bonds occurs off exchange,
meaning that investor liquidity needs are mostly satisfied on the exchange.
To measure the liquidity of Israeli equities and corporate bonds, I obtain intraday trade
and quotation data from the TASE. Similar to the US TAQ data, the Israeli trade and
quotation data contains a complete intraday history of all trades and quotations on the
exchange, including execution prices, transaction volume, quoted bid and ask, and the
quantities available at those prices. The high frequency data is complemented with security
level characteristics from Bloomberg, and with Moody’s credit ratings obtained from the
website www.valuation.co.il.9
To be included in my samples, Israeli securities must go through the same filters that were
applied to US securities.10 The final Israeli sample is composed of 51 firms that collectively
have 139 bonds outstanding. The equity sample contains 7 million transactions and 140
million intraday quotes. The bond sample contains 4 million transactions and 321 million
intraday quotes. This high frequency data is used to compute yearly aggregates of quoted
and effective spreads, following the procedure outlined for US equities.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1.1 present descriptive statistics for the Israeli bond
and equity samples. When applicable, amounts expressed in New Israeli Shekel (NIS) have
been converted to US dollars assuming that 1 USD is worth 3.7 NIS, which corresponds to
the average exchange rate over 2013-2015. The first two rows of the table show that, in sharp
contrast with the modern US sample, Israeli equities are about three times more expensive
to trade than Israeli bonds: the average quoted and effective spreads are respectively 0.22%
and 0.20% for bonds, and 0.73% and 0.65% for equities. Moreover, the transaction costs of
exchange traded Israeli bonds are about one-third those of OTC traded US bonds. This is
remarkable since the Israeli corporate bond market is much thinner than its US counterpart:
9I thank Eran Ben-Horin form for providing me with the data.
10I require securities to be covered by Bloomberg (instead of CRSP or Mergent FISD). To compute the
market capitalization and volume filters, I convert the New Israeli Shekels (NIS) amounts to US dollars
using an exchange rate of 3.7, the average exchange rate over 2013-2015. Otherwise, the sample selection
procedure is the same as for modern US securities.
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the average Israeli (US) bond has a market capitalization of 228 (690) million dollars, a daily
trading volume 0.55 (2.11) million dollars, and an annual turnover of 61% (86%). The Israeli
example shows that corporate bonds can be successfully traded on a centralized venue in
market that is thinner than the current US bond market.
In terms of their characteristics, Israeli bonds are similar to their US counterparts in several
respects: they have similar time to maturity, similar volatility, and a similar fraction of them
are secured. In both samples, over 90% of the bonds have early redemption features, with
the difference that US bonds are mostly callable while Israeli bonds mostly have sinking
funds. Israeli and US bonds are different in that CPI indexation is quite frequent in Israel,
while nonexistent in the US sample. In addition, a larger fraction of Israeli bonds are
unrated.
1.3.3. Early 20th Century US Market
During the first half of the century, US bonds and stocks were actively traded on organized
exchanges and on over-the-counter markets. Hickman (1960) reports that, of all the active
exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had the largest listed capitalization and
total trading volume.
To measure the liquidity of corporate bonds and equities in the historical setting, I hand
collect monthly quotations and volume data for NYSE listed securities from the Bank
and Quotation section of the Commercial & Financial Chronicle. The coverage of this
publication is comprehensive; it includes end of month quotations and transaction volume
for all NYSE listed equities and corporate bonds. This data is used to compute yearly quoted
spread measures by averaging the monthly quotations. I was unable to obtain high frequency
transaction level data for this time period, which prevents me from computing effective
spread measures.11 At the time I collected the data, digitized copies of the publication were
11Interestingly, a record of all transactions in US equities and corporate bonds as well as daily bid and ask
quotations were published by Francis Emory Fitch. These records are available at the archive of the NYSE,
but I was unable to access and digitize a comprehensive sample.
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publicly available from 1895 until the end of 1921 at the HathiTrust Digital Library.12 Given
the costs involved, I decided to limit data collection to five years. I chose the most recent
years available since this is were the cross-sectional coverage is the most comprehensive.
To obtain data on securities characteristics, I hand collected data from the Moody’s ma-
nuals. The Moody’s manuals contain useful information on bond characteristics, such as
issuance and maturity date, credit ratings, embedded options, as well as information on the
outstanding amount of stocks and bonds. Moreover, the Moody’s manuals contain a list of
all the securities issued by a given firm, which streamlines the identification of firms that
have both an issue of common stock and at least one issue of corporate bond outstanding.
To be included in my samples in a given year, securities must go through to the same filters
that were applied to Israeli and modern US securities.13 The final sample is composed of 76
firms that collectively have 188 corporate bonds outstanding. The equity sample contains
3,728 monthly quotations, while the final bond sample has 7,522.
The last two columns of Table 1.1 present descriptive statistics for my historical US sample.
The quantities expressed in dollars have been CPI adjusted by a factor of 16 to convert
them in 2015 USD. Consistent with the Israeli findings, the first row of the table shows that
exchange traded US corporate bonds used to have smaller transaction costs than equities:
the average quoted spread was 2.09% for corporate bonds compared to 2.72% for equities.
This is despite the fact that the US corporate bond market was thin compared to the equity
market: the average stock (bond) had a market capitalization of 982 (368) million dollars,
a daily trading volume of 3.10 (0.07) million dollars, and an annual turnover of 112% (6%).
While US corporate bonds in the early 20th century had characteristics similar to their
modern counterparts, a few differences are noteworthy. First, bonds typically had longer
12https://www.hathitrust.org/
13I require securities to be covered by the Moody’s manuals (instead of CRSP, Mergent FISD, or Bloom-
berg). To compute the market capitalization and volume filters, the dollar amounts have been CPI adjusted
by a factor of 16 to convert them in 2015 USD. Instead of requiring 40 daily midpoint returns, I require
7 monthly midpoint returns. Otherwise, the sample selection procedure is the same as for the modern US
securities and the Israeli securities.
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time to maturity: the average time to maturity at issuance used to be 51 years compared to
12 years for the modern US bonds. In addition, a large fraction of the bonds were secured,
which probably explains the large fraction of investment grade bonds. In the era of the gold
standard, 84% of the bonds were carrying gold clauses. This contractual feature protected
investors against the inflation that would follow a depreciation of the dollar against gold.
In this sense, these clauses were similar in spirit to modern CPI indexation clauses. See
Edwards, Longstaff, and Garcia Marin (2015) for a detailed account of the history of gold
clauses.
1.4. Counterfactual Transaction Cost Estimation
The observations reported in Table 1.1 suggest that corporate bonds trading in a centrali-
zed venue have lower transaction costs than equities on average, while the opposite holds
when bonds are trading OTC. In this section, I show that this observation still holds af-
ter controlling for known determinants of transaction costs and bond characteristics. The
regression results suggest that, conditional on volume and volatility, corporate bonds have
similar or lower transaction costs than equities when they both trade on limit order books.
I use this result to infer counterfactual transaction cost estimates for US corporate bond
based on the transaction costs of US equities.
1.4.1. Transaction Costs Analysis
Table 1.2 reports the results of quoted spread regressions on trading volume, return volati-
lity, and corporate bond indicator variables. In each specification, the continuous variables
are log-transformed. The logarithm of volume and volatility are demeaned by their average
across corporate bonds. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Specification (1) includes trading volume, return volatility, and a corporate bond indicator
as independent variables. The results for the modern US sample suggest that, even after
controlling for differences in trading activity and volatility, OTC traded corporate bonds
are more expensive to trade than equities. The coefficient on the bond indicator is 1.88 and
17
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that, conditional on having the same
trading volume and volatility, the transaction costs of OTC traded US corporate bonds are
555% larger (6.55 times larger) than the transaction costs of exchange traded US equities.14
On the contrary, the results for the Israeli and the historical US sample suggest that,
conditional on volume and volatility, exchange traded corporate bonds have similar or lower
transaction costs than equities. In the Israeli sample, the coefficient on the bond indicator is
0.03, implying that bond transaction costs are on average 3% larger than equity transaction
costs once we control for volume and volatility. That coefficient, is not statistically different
from zero. In the historical sample, this coefficient is -0.89 and significant at the 1% level,
implying that bond transaction costs are on average 59% lower for bonds.
To investigate how the previous results relate to bond characteristics, specification (2) repla-
ces the corporate bond indicator variable with a set of bond characteristic indicators. The
estimates show that the previous results are consistent across all credit ratings, maturities,
and contractual features. In the modern US sample, the coefficients on bond characteristics
are all positive and statistically significant, with the exception of the coefficients on the
callable and secured indicators which are not significant. In the Israeli and historical US
sample, the coefficients are all negative or statistically insignificant.
In order to test if the elasticities of transaction costs to volume and volatility are different be-
tween bonds and stocks, specification (3) adds bond-volume and bond-volatility interaction
terms to the regression model. The results show that, when bonds trade on exchange, these
elasticities are similar between the two asset classes. For both the Israeli and historical
US sample, the coefficients on bond-volume (0.05 for Israel and 0.03 for the US) and bond-
volatility (0.04 for Israel and -0.07 for the US) are small relative to the coefficient on volume
(-0.55 for Israel and -0.43 for the US) and volatility (0.60 for Israel and 0.46 for the US).
None of the interaction terms are statistically different from zero. In terms of magnitudes,
the coefficients on volume and bond-volume for the historical US sample imply that a 10%
14The average effect is given by
(
e1.88 − 1) · 100% = 555%.
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increase in trading volume is associated with a decrease of 3.49% in equity transaction costs
and a decrease of 3.30% in bond transaction costs.
In contrast, the results from the modern US sample suggest that the elasticity of transaction
costs to trading volume is lower for OTC corporate bonds than for centralized equities. The
coefficient on volume is -0.39 and the coefficient on bond-volume is 0.17. These coefficients
imply that a 10% increase in trading volume is associated with a 3.2% decline in tran-
saction costs for equities and a 1.9% decrease in transaction costs for bonds. This evidence
suggests that volume has a larger impact on transaction costs when trades are centralized.
This supports the view that, when investors need to trade often, consolidating the market
eliminates more frictions. The coefficient on the bond-volatility interaction is -0.09 and
marginally statistically significant. Unlike the previous results, this estimate is not robust
to the choice of the transaction cost metrics, as shown in Table 1.3.
In Table 1.3, I repeat the previous analysis for the Israeli and the modern US sample using
effective spreads as transaction cost measure. With the exception of the coefficient on bond-
volatility in specification 3 of the modern US sample which is now positive and statistically
insignificant, all the other results are qualitatively similar.
To summarize, the evidence suggests that, after controlling for differences in volume and vo-
latility, corporate bonds trading in a centralized venue have similar or even lower transaction
costs than equities. The results are consistent across bonds with different characteristics.
Moreover, the elasticities of transaction costs to volume and volatility are similar between
bonds and equities when they trade on a centralized venue. The next subsection makes use
of these observations to build counterfactual estimates of what would be the transaction
costs of US corporate bonds if trading was centralized.
1.4.2. Equity-implied transaction costs
Based on the evidence presented so far, I propose to infer the transaction costs that corpo-
rate bonds would have on a centralized venue from the transaction costs of equities. The
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estimation of equity-implied bond transaction costs is done in two steps. The first step
consists of regressing equity transaction costs (either quoted spread or effective spread) on
trading volume and volatility
log (Seit) = β0 + β1 log (volumeeit) + β2 log (volatilityeit) + eit, (1.4)
where Seit is the equity transaction cost of firm i in year t. The fitted values of this regression
can be used to infer what would be the transaction cost of a stock having the same volume
and volatility as a given bond. Under the assumption that bonds and stocks have the
same expected transaction costs conditional on volume and volatility, the equity-implied
estimates are given by
log
(
Sˆbjt
)
= βˆ0 + βˆ1 log (volumebjt) + βˆ2 log
(
volatilitybjt
)
, (1.5)
where Sˆbjt denotes the counterfactual transaction cost estimates for bond j in year t, and
volumebjt and volatilitybjt are the volume and volatility that bond j would have on the
centralized venue in year t.
Two remarks are in order. First, we should suspect the estimator to be upward biased.
The results of the previous section suggest that, after controlling for differences in volume
and volatility, corporate bonds in the centralized Israeli and historical US markets have
similar or lower transaction costs than equities. Second, the estimator requires knowledge
of the volume and volatility that a given bond would have on a centralized venue. This
is challenging to obtain since all we currently observe in the US are the corresponding
decentralized quantities. I address this issue indirectly. I argue, based on the experience
of the 1997 market reforms of the Nasdaq, that applying the estimator using the volume
and volatility measured OTC provides an upper bound S¯bjt on the proper equity-implied
estimate Sˆbjt.
In early 1997, the SEC implemented several new regulations that significantly changed how
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the Nasdaq processed orders. Before the introduction of the new rules, the Nasdaq had
operated as a fragmented dealer market, akin to the current US corporate bond market in
many respects. For example, investors were unable to compete directly with market makers
by posting limit orders, and the best available prices were not always publicly accessible.
Under the new rules, dealers had to display customer limit orders, and the best available
prices were made available to all market participants (see Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel,
and Schultz (1999) for a detailed discussion of the reform).
Weston (2000) shows that following these policy changes, transaction costs decreased by
30% and trading volume increased by 30%. Moreover, Sapp and Yan (2003) show that the
volatility of Nasdaq stocks decreased following the reforms. Given the similarities between
the reforms implemented on the Nasdaq and the ones proposed for the bond market, mo-
ving bond trading to centralized venues would likely increase trading activity and decrease
volatility as well. Since the coefficient on volume, βˆ1, is negative and the coefficient on
volatility, βˆ2, is positive, applying the estimator using decentralized measures of volume
and volatility provides an upper bound S¯bjt on Sˆbjt.
Before applying the estimator to the modern US bond market, I test its performance in the
Israeli and historical US samples. In both markets, volume and volatility are measured on
centralized venues, and the proper equity implied estimates can be compared against mea-
sured transaction costs to test the accuracy of the estimator. As expected, the coefficients
obtained in the first step of the estimation procedure are nearly identical to those reported
in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, thus I do not report them separately.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the performance of the estimator in the cross-section of bonds.
Each figure plots measured transaction costs on the y-axis against equity implied estimates
on the x-axis; each point represents a bond-year. For bonds lying under the 45-degree line,
equity-implied estimates overshoot measured transaction costs, and vice versa. Each figure
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reports the cross-sectional quartiles of the relative error (RE) defined as
RE =
Sˆbjt − Sbjt
Sbjt
, (1.6)
where Sˆbjt is the equity-implied estimate of bond j in year t, and Sbjt is the measured
transaction cost of the same bond.
Figure 1.1 displays the Israeli results for quoted and effective spreads. Both graphs indicate
that the estimator performs quite well in the Israeli sample. Measured and predicted spreads
are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 83% for quoted spreads and 72% for
effective spreads. The median relative error is 12% for quoted spreads, and 22% for effective
spreads. Hence the equity implied estimator tends to overshoot measured transaction costs
in the Israeli sample.
Figure 1.2 displays the estimator’s performance for quoted bond spreads in the historical
US sample. While measured and predicted transaction costs are still highly correlated,
with a correlation coefficient of 71%, the figure shows that the equity-implied estimates
overshoot measurements substantially. The median relative error is 149%, meaning that
equity implied estimates for the median bond is more than twice as large as the measured
transaction cost. Together, these results confirm that the equity-implied estimator tends to
overestimate the actual transaction costs of corporate bonds on centralized venues.
I now apply the equity-implied estimator to the modern US bond market. Again, the
coefficient obtained in the first step of the estimation procedure are virtually identical
to those reported in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, thus I do not report them separately. Figures 1.3
illustrates the results of the second step of the estimation. In this figure, the x-axis represent
the equity-implied estimate obtained using OTC measures of volume and volatility, and the
y-axis displays the transaction costs measured OTC. The figure reports the cross-sectional
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quartiles of the predicted percent change (PC) defined as
PC =
S¯bjt − Sbjt
Sbjt
, (1.7)
where S¯bjt is the equity-implied estimate of bond j in year t, and Sbjt is the OTC transaction
cost for the same bond.
According to the estimates, moving to a centralized market structure would reduce the
median quoted spread by 74%, and the median effective spread by 63%. The quoted spread
of all bonds is predicted to decrease while the effective spread of 94% of the bonds is expected
to decrease. Recall that those are conservative estimates of the transaction decrease since
the equity-implied estimator tends to overestimate actual transaction costs.
Table 1.4 reports descriptive statistics for the projected transaction costs savings. In this
table, the bond-year estimates and measurements of each bond have been averaged over the
sample period. We see that quoted spreads would on average decrease by 43bp, from 56bp
to 13bp, and effective spreads would decrease by 16bp, from 23bp to 7bp.
To get a sense of the dollar value of the transaction cost savings implied by these estimates,
Table 1.4 also reports statistics on dollar annual savings (DAS) defined as
ADSbj = annual volumebj
(
measured ESbj − predicted ESbj
2
)
, (1.8)
and on relative annual savings (RAS) defined as
ARSbj =
ADSbj
total par valuebj
, (1.9)
where annual volumebj is a bond j’s average annual OTC trading volume over the sample
period, measured ESbj is the bond’s average OTC effective spread, predicted ESbj is the
bond’s average equity-implied effective spread, and total par valuebj is the bond’s average
outstanding total par value. The table also reports the present value of the transaction cost
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savings over a bond’s life, PV(DAS) and PV(RAS), defined as
PV(ADS)bj =
(
1− e−rT
r
)
DASbj , (1.10)
and
PV(ARS)bj =
(
1− e−rT
r
)
RASbj , (1.11)
where T is the time to maturity at issuance of the bond, and r is the risk-free rate, which
I assume equal to 2%.
The table shows that, for the average bond, annual transaction cost savings amount to
$0.42 million, or 6 basis point of the total par value. Over a bond’s life, the present value of
the projected transaction cost savings is $4.74 million, or 66 basis points of total par value.
Aggregating the savings over the sample, I obtain that a centralized market structure would
generate transaction cost savings of $681 million per year. This amount represents 6 bp of
the 1.2 trillion in bond par value. The present value of the aggregate savings over the life
of those 1,642 bonds is $6.7 billion or 66 bp of total par value. Table 1.4 also reveals that
there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the predicted reduction in transaction costs.
For example, the effective spread of the bond at the 5th percentile would decrease by only
1 bp, while the effective spread of the bond at the 95th percentile would decrease by 54 bp.
Table 1.5 reports the regression results of transaction cost savings on various bond charac-
teristics. In each regression the logarithm of total par value and year to maturity have been
demeaned. Standard errors are clustered at the issuer level.
The dependent variables in the first two columns of Table 1.5 are respectively the percentage
change in quoted and effective spreads, as defined in equation 1.7. The intercept -0.72 in the
first column means that, if trading were to migrate to centralized venues, the quoted spread
of an unsecured and non-callable investment grade bond of average market capitalization
and average time to maturity would decrease by 72% on average. The intercept -0.47 in
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the second column has a similar interpretation for effective spreads. Both intercepts are
statistically significant.
High yields bond would experience even larger reduction in transaction costs. In the first
column, the coefficient -0.11 on the high yield dummy implies that the expected decrease
in quoted spread is 11% larger for high yield bonds that for investment grade bonds. For
effective spreads, the corresponding coefficient is -0.21. Both coefficients are statistically
significant. Similarly, issues with longer time to maturity would experience larger decrease
in transaction costs. In the first column, the coefficient on the logarithm of year to maturity
is -0.02, which implies that a 1% increase in year to maturity implies yields an additional
0.02% decrease in quoted spread. The corresponding coefficient for effective spread is -0.01.
Only the coefficient on quoted spread is statistically significant. Larger issues would also
experience larger decrease in their effective spread; the coefficient -0.18 implies that a 1%
increase on total par value yields an additional 0.18% decrease in effective spread. The
coefficient is statistically significant. The corresponding coefficient for quoted spread is
close to zero and not statistically significant. Lastly, the coefficients on the callable and
secured dummies are insignificant.
The dependent variable in the third column is the logarithm of annual dollar savings (ADS).
The results show that the projected annual transaction cost savings are greater for large
high yield issues with longer time to maturity. The coefficient 1.26 on total par value implies
that a 1% increase in total par value is associated with an increase in annual transaction
cost savings of 2.52%.15 Similarly, the coefficient 0.49 on year to maturity implies that
a 1% increase in year to maturity yields an increase of 0.63% in annual transaction cost
savings. The coefficient 1.36 on the high yield dummy implies that high yield bonds would
experience annual transaction savings 290% greater than investment grade bonds, keeping
everything else constant. The coefficients on the callable and secured dummies are here
again insignificant. Unreported regressions of the other transaction cost saving metrics
15The marginal effect of one percent increase in total par value is given by
(
e1.26 − 1)% = 2.52%.
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(ARS, PV(ADS), and PV(ARS)) yield qualitatively similar results.
1.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that the transaction costs of corporate bonds would decline
substantially if corporate bonds trading migrated from the current decentralized OTC mar-
ket structure to a centralized market structure. The change would generate significant
transaction cost savings for investors, particularly for large speculative issues with long
time to maturity. While interesting in themselves, these results do not directly address
the central question of this paper: would a centralized market structure be more efficient?
Indeed, transaction costs are not deadweight losses, but rather a transfer of wealth between
liquidity providers and liquidity seekers. The next chapter investigates this last question in
greater details.
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Table 1.2: Quoted Spread Regressions
US (2013-2015) Israel (2013-2015) US (1917-1921)
Dependent Variable: Log(QS) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Bond 1.88∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.89∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Log(volume) -0.29∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bond × log(volume) 0.17∗∗∗ 0.05 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Log(Std returns) 0.46∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Bond × log(std returns) -0.09∗∗ 0.04 -0.07
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06)
IG × ST 1.28∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.13 -1.08∗∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13)
IG × LT 1.47∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.04 0.02 -0.96∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.11) (0.13)
HY × ST 2.01∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
HY × LT 1.84∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.23 0.18 -0.76∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.13) (0.15)
NR × ST 1.21∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ -0.15 -0.16
(0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18)
NR × LT 1.44∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 0.11 0.09
(0.08) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)
CPI linked/Gold clause 0.12∗ 0.12∗ 0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Callable 0.02 0.06 -0.32∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04)
Sinkable -0.21∗ -0.21 0.01 0.00
(0.12) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04)
Secured 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Observations 3547 3378 3378 414 414 414 989 989 989
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.81 0.81 0.81
The dependent variable is the annual average quoted spread (QS), calculated according to equation (1.2); details
regarding time aggregation are provided in Section 1.3. A bond is classified as short term (ST) if it has five years
or less until maturity, and long term (LT) otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in Table 1.1. In all
specifications, standard errors are clustered at the firm (or issuer) level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Effective Spread Regressions
US (2013-2015) Israel (2013-2015)
Dependent Variable: Log(ES) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Bond 1.60∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.07) (0.08)
Log(volume) -0.20∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Bond ×log(volume) 0.23∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Log(Std returns) 0.54∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Bond ×log(std returns) 0.03 0.10
(0.05) (0.08)
IG × ST 1.22∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.07
(0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17)
IG × LT 1.25∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.17 0.09
(0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19)
HY × ST 1.73∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.10 0.00
(0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14)
HY × LT 1.80∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.17
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.15)
NR × ST 1.17∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.04
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
NR × LT 1.28∗∗∗ 0.77 0.21 0.13
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14)
CPI linked/Gold clause 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Callable 0.04 0.10 -0.32∗∗ -0.31∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
Sinkable -0.25∗∗ -0.26
(0.12) (0.13)
Secured -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 3539 3371 3371 414 414 414
R-squared 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.89 0.90 0.90
The dependent variable is the annual average effective spread (ES), calculated according to equation (1.3); details
regarding time aggregation are provided in Section 1.3. A bond is classified as short term (ST) if it has five years or less
until maturity, and long term (LT) otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in Table 1.1. In all specifications,
standard errors are clustered at the firm (or issuer) level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Measured vs. Predicted Transaction Costs
US(2013 – 2015)
Mean Std P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95
Quoted spread
predicted (bp) 13 6 5 9 12 15 24
measured (bp) 56 34 17 29 46 77 121
difference (bp) -43 -28 -12 -20 -34 -62 -97
percent change (%) -77 -82 -71 -69 -74 -81 -80
Effective spread
predicted (bp) 7 3 3 5 6 9 13
measured (bp) 23 23 4 10 17 28 67
difference (bp) -16 -20 -1 -5 -11 -17 -54
percent change (%) -70 -87 -25 -50 -65 -61 -81
Transaction cost savings
Annual dollar savings ($mn) 0.42 0.53 0 0.07 0.21 0.57 1.51
Annual relative savings (bp of par) 6 7 0 1 3 8 20
PV dollar savings ($mn) 4.74 7.63 0 0.45 1.66 5.65 21.81
PV relative savings (bp of par) 66 95 0 8 29 81 256
This table reports cross-sectional descriptive statistics of the predicted change in transaction costs from moving to
a centralized market structure. Quoted spread is defined in equation (1.3), and effective spread in equation (1.2).
Predicted spread measures are obtained following the two-step procedure characterized by equations (1.4) and (1.5).
Annual transaction cost savings are defined in equations (1.8) and (1.9), and the present values of the transaction
cost savings over the lifetime of a bond are defined in equations (1.10) and (1.11).
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Table 1.5: Transaction Cost Savings in the Cross Section of Bonds
Dependent Variable ∆Quoted spread ∆Effective spread Log(ADS)
Intercept -0.72∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -2.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14)
Log(total par value) 0.00 -0.18∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07)
Log(time to maturity) -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 0.49∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05)
HY -0.11∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.10)
NR 0.01 -0.02 0.36∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14)
Callable 0.02 -0.04 0.22
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14)
Secured -0.02 -0.01 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09)
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642
R-squared 0.24 0.20 0.41
The dependent variable in the first column is the ratio of predicted quoted spread to measured quoted spread. The
quoted spread is calculated according to equation (1.2). The dependent variable in the second column is the ratio of
predicted effective spread to measured effective spread. The effective spread is calculated according to equation (1.3).
The dependent variable in the third column in the annual dollar savings defined in equation (1.8). The independent
variables are all defined in Table 1.1. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the firm (issuer) level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
31
F
ig
u
re
1
.1
:
M
ea
su
re
d
v
s.
p
re
d
ic
te
d
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
Is
ra
el
(2
01
3–
20
15
)
0
0.
05
0.
1
0.
15
0.
2
0.
25
0.
3
0.
35
0.
4
0.
45
0.
5
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 (%
)
0
0.
050.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
250.
3
0.
350.
4
0.
450.
5
Measured (%)
Qu
ot
ed
 s
pr
ea
d
R
el
at
iv
e 
er
ro
r: 
 
 
 
Q1
 =
   
   
  -
7%
 
 
 
M
ed
ia
n 
= 
12
%
 
 
 
Q3
 =
   
   
  4
3%
0
0.
05
0.
1
0.
15
0.
2
0.
25
0.
3
0.
35
0.
4
0.
45
0.
5
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 (%
)
0
0.
050.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
250.
3
0.
350.
4
0.
450.
5
Measured (%)
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
sp
re
ad
R
el
at
iv
e 
er
ro
r: 
 
 
 
Q1
 =
   
   
  -
2%
 
 
 
M
ed
ia
n 
= 
22
%
 
 
 
Q3
 =
   
   
  4
8%
T
h
es
e
tw
o
fi
g
u
re
s
p
lo
t
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s,
o
n
th
e
y
-a
x
is
,
a
g
a
in
st
th
e
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s,
o
n
th
e
x
-a
x
is
,
fo
r
b
o
n
d
s
in
th
e
Is
ra
el
i
sa
m
p
le
.
E
a
ch
p
o
in
t
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
b
o
n
d
-y
ea
r.
T
h
e
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
tw
o
-s
te
p
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
ch
a
ra
ct
er
iz
ed
b
y
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
s
(1
.4
)
a
n
d
(1
.5
).
T
h
e
le
ft
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
q
u
o
te
d
sp
re
a
d
s,
w
h
il
e
th
e
ri
g
h
t
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
eff
ec
ti
v
e
sp
re
a
d
s.
F
o
r
b
o
n
d
s
ly
in
g
u
n
d
er
th
e
re
d
4
5
d
eg
re
e
li
n
e,
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
v
er
sh
o
o
t
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s,
a
n
d
v
ic
e-
v
er
sa
.
T
h
e
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
th
re
e
q
u
a
rt
il
e
o
f
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
m
ea
n
er
ro
r,
a
s
d
efi
n
ed
in
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
.6
).
A
p
o
si
ti
v
e
re
la
ti
v
e
er
ro
r
m
ea
n
s
th
a
t
th
e
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
is
la
rg
er
th
a
n
th
e
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
.
32
F
ig
u
re
1.
2:
M
ea
su
re
d
v
s.
p
re
d
ic
te
d
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
U
S
(1
91
7–
19
21
)
0
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
5
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 (%
)
0
0.
51
1.
52
2.
53
3.
54
4.
55
Measured (%)
Qu
ot
ed
 s
pr
ea
d
R
el
at
iv
e 
er
ro
r: 
 
 
 
Q1
 =
   
   
  9
9%
 
 
 
M
ed
ia
n 
= 
14
9%
 
 
 
Q3
 =
   
   
  2
09
%
T
h
is
fi
g
u
re
p
lo
ts
m
ea
su
re
d
q
u
o
te
d
sp
re
a
d
,
o
n
th
e
y
-a
x
is
,
a
g
a
in
st
th
e
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s,
o
n
th
e
x
-a
x
is
,
fo
r
b
o
n
d
s
in
th
e
h
is
to
ri
ca
l
U
S
sa
m
p
le
.
E
a
ch
p
o
in
t
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
b
o
n
d
-y
ea
r.
T
h
e
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
tw
o
-s
te
p
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
ch
a
ra
ct
er
iz
ed
b
y
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
s
(1
.4
)
a
n
d
(1
.5
).
F
o
r
b
o
n
d
s
ly
in
g
u
n
d
er
th
e
re
d
4
5
d
eg
re
e
li
n
e,
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
v
er
sh
o
o
t
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s,
a
n
d
v
ic
e-
v
er
sa
.
T
h
e
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
th
re
e
q
u
a
rt
il
e
o
f
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
m
ea
n
er
ro
r,
a
s
d
efi
n
ed
in
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
.6
).
A
p
o
si
ti
v
e
re
la
ti
v
e
er
ro
r
m
ea
n
s
th
a
t
th
e
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
is
la
rg
er
th
a
n
th
e
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
.
33
F
ig
u
re
1.
3:
M
ea
su
re
d
v
s.
p
re
d
ic
te
d
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
U
S
(2
01
3–
20
15
)
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 (%
)
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
91
Measured (%)
Qu
ot
ed
 s
pr
ea
d
Pe
rc
en
t c
ha
ng
e:
 
 
 
 
Q1
 =
   
   
  -
81
%
 
 
 
M
ed
ia
n 
= 
-7
4%
 
 
 
Q3
 =
   
   
  -
66
%
0
0.
05
0.
1
0.
15
0.
2
0.
25
0.
3
0.
35
0.
4
0.
45
0.
5
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 (%
)
0
0.
050.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
250.
3
0.
350.
4
0.
450.
5
Measured (%)
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
sp
re
ad
Pe
rc
en
t c
ha
ng
e:
 
 
 
 
Q1
 =
   
   
  -
75
%
 
 
 
M
ed
ia
n 
= 
-6
3%
 
 
 
Q3
 =
   
   
  -
44
%
T
h
es
e
tw
o
fi
g
u
re
s
p
lo
t
O
T
C
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s,
o
n
th
e
y
-a
x
is
,
a
g
a
in
st
th
e
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s,
o
n
th
e
x
-a
x
is
,
fo
r
b
o
n
d
s
in
th
e
m
o
d
er
n
U
S
sa
m
p
le
.
E
a
ch
p
o
in
t
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
b
o
n
d
-y
ea
r.
T
h
e
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
tw
o
-s
te
p
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
ch
a
ra
ct
er
iz
ed
b
y
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
s
(1
.4
)
a
n
d
(1
.5
).
T
h
e
le
ft
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
q
u
o
te
d
sp
re
a
d
s,
w
h
il
e
th
e
ri
g
h
t
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
eff
ec
ti
v
e
sp
re
a
d
s.
F
o
r
b
o
n
d
s
ly
in
g
u
n
d
er
th
e
re
d
4
5
d
eg
re
e
li
n
e,
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
v
er
sh
o
o
t
m
ea
su
re
d
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s,
a
n
d
v
ic
e-
v
er
sa
.
T
h
e
fi
g
u
re
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
th
re
e
q
u
a
rt
il
e
o
f
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
p
er
ce
n
t
ch
a
n
g
e,
a
s
d
efi
n
ed
in
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
.7
).
A
n
eg
a
ti
v
e
p
er
ce
n
t
ch
a
n
g
e
m
ea
n
s
th
a
t
th
e
eq
u
it
y
-i
m
p
li
ed
es
ti
m
a
te
p
re
d
ic
ts
th
a
t
th
e
tr
a
n
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
o
f
th
e
b
o
n
d
w
o
u
ld
d
ec
re
a
se
o
n
a
ce
n
tr
a
li
ze
d
v
en
u
e.
34
CHAPTER 2 : Theory and Welfare Analysis
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I build a structural model to evaluate the welfare implications of a change
in market structure. Interestingly, the model delivers sufficient statistics for the relative
efficiency of the two market structures that connect welfare to transaction costs. The
empirical work done in the previous section turns out to be essential for welfare calculations.
2.2. Model
Time is continuous and runs forever, t ∈ [0,∞). The economy features two types of agent,
investors and market-makers. All agents are risk-neutral and infinitely lived, with time
preference determined by a constant discount rate r > 0. Agents have access to a bond,
available in fixed supply x. The bond pays a coupon at rate c until it matures, at which
point the bond holder receives principal p. Maturity occurs randomly at Poisson rate η. The
bond either trades on a centralized market structure, modeled as a central limit order book,
or a decentralized market structure, modeled as a dealer market operating on a request
for quote basis. The two market structures are subject to imperfect trading processes that
impose costs and delays on market participants. In both market-structures, market-makers
are necessary to intermediate trades; they act as passthrough intermediaries and never hold
the bond in inventory.
2.2.1. Investors and Market Makers
Investors are characterized by their holding of the bond, restricted to either 0 or 1, and
their intrinsic liquidity type that is either ”h” or ”l”. Type l owners bear a holding cost δ
per unit of time, whereas type h owners do not. Type h agents switch to type l at Poisson
rate ξ. The transition process are independent across investors. Once an investor is hit
by a ”liquidity shock”, he remains of type l forever. While I do not explicitly model the
nature of these liquidity shocks in this paper, there are many possible ways to interpret
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them. For instance, they might represent changes in investor’s subjective valuation of the
asset, a sudden need for cash, changes in hedging need, or any conceivable event that lead
investors to reallocate their portfolio.
The full set of investor types is then T = {h0, h1, l0, l1}, where ”h” and ”l” designate the
investor’s subjective valuation of the asset, and ”0” and ”1” represent the quantity of asset
owned. There is a continuum of non-atomistic agents; the measure of investor of type κ ∈ T
at time t is denoted by µκ,t. I assume throughout the paper that there is, at all times, an
infinite measure of type h0, µh0,t = ∞. There are gain from trade between investors of
type h0 and type l1, however trade execution is not instantaneous and participating in the
market involves flow costs.
The flow participation cost of buyers (sellers) in market structure k ∈ {c, d} is denoted by
χkb (χ
k
s), where the letter ”c” designates a centralized market structure, and the letter ”d”
designates a decentralized market structure. These parameters stand for the opportunity
cost of investor’s time, and for the inconvenience of executing a trade: in a decentralized
venue, these costs account for the effort exerted to contact and negotiate with dealers, while
in a centralized venue, they represent the cost of monitoring the market and splitting orders
to ensure fair execution. Participation in the market is voluntary. Investors dynamically
choose, at each instant, whether to participate or stay out of the market. They may suspend
and resume their market activity at no cost.
Market makers face a similar participation decision. Active market makers have the op-
portunity to intermediate trades and earn the bid-ask spread, however, market-making
involves a flow cost χkm. This parameter stands for the labor and capital costs associated
with market-making (hiring traders, financing the balance sheet, IT investment, the cost
of settling and clearing trades.) In a decentralized venue, this parameter also embeds the
cost of maintaining relationships with customers. In a centralized venue, it accounts for the
cost of continuously monitoring the market and updating quotations. There is an infinite
measure of potential entrant in the market-making industry. The market structure specifies
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the trading procedure by which market makers intermediate transactions.
2.2.2. Market Structures
In the decentralized market structure, the asset trades on a request for quote basis. Investors
privately contact market-makers and negotiate over the price – i.e., market-makers do not
post firm quotes publicly. In a centralized market structure, however, the quotations of
market-makers are publicly disseminated in a central limit order book. I assume that,
under both market structures, technological constraints prevent trades from being executed
instantly. In practice, there is a variety of reasons that can justify this assumption.
In decentralized market, delays can occur because investors need time to contact and ne-
gotiate with dealers, and dealers need time to find suitable counterparties. In a centralized
market, delays may happen when market depth is insufficient such that orders must be
split to prevent front running, or when quotes are stale at the time liquidity is needed. In
both market structures, market participants might need to gather and process information
about the asset before committing to a transaction, Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2013).
There may also be technological and institutional constraints that limit the rate at which
market-makers can clear and settle trades.
In this paper, I abstract from modeling the exact source of trading delays. Instead, these
frictions are subsumed under trade processing functions. Formally, suppose that at time t
there is a measure bt of buyers, a measure mt of market-makers, and a measure st of sellers.
I assume that the rate at which trades are executed on the venue k ∈ {c, d} is equal to
gkt = g
k (bt,mt, st) = λ
kbα
k
t m
βk
t s
1−αk−βk
t ,
a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas function.1 For convenience, denote the the execu-
1As Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015) write, ”Whether or not the order execution technology has
constant return to scale remains an open question in the context of asset markets. Unfortunately, in contrast
to the labor market–where reliable data exist for the number of unemployed workers, the number of vacancies,
and the number of matches that form in a particular labor market–the analogous data for financial markets
is elusive.”
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tion rate of a market participant of type φ ∈ {b,m, s} on market structure k by ρkφt =
gkt
φt
.
The law of motion of the measure of low valuation owners in market structure k follows
µ˙kl1,t = −gkt + ξµkh1,t, (2.1)
where the first term on the right-hand side accounts for the flow gkt of type-l1 investors who
sell their asset, and the second term reflects that type-h1 are hit by liquidity shocks at rate
ξ. Combining the last equation with the market clearing condition
µkh1,t + µ
k
l1,t = x, (2.2)
delivers the law of motion of the measure of high valuation owners µkh1,t.
2.2.3. Decentralized Equilibrium
In the decentralized market structure, investors and market makers first make their entry
decision, and later negotiate on the price. Denote by V dκ,t the value function of an investor
of type κ ∈ T when the bond trades OTC. The value function of a potential buyer, V dh0,t,
satisfies the HJB equation
rV dh0,t =V˙
d
h0,t + max
{
0, ρdbt
(
V dh1,t − V dh0,t −Adt
)
− χdb
}
+ ξ
(
V dl0,t − V dh0,t
)
, (2.3)
where Adt is the ask price a buyer can negotiate at time t. This equation implies that a
buyer benefits from participating whenever the rate of execution of his order, ρdbt , times the
private surplus he obtains when he purchases the asset,
(
V dh1,t − V dh0,t −Adt
)
, is greater than
the flow participation cost, χdb . Free entry, combined with the assumption that there is an
infinite measure of potential buyers, implies that in equilibrium ρdbt
(
V dh1,t − V dh0,t −Adt
)
≤
χdb , otherwise additional buyers would enter the market. This last expression holds with
equality whenever bt > 0, otherwise some buyers would strictly prefer to leave the market.
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The value functions of the other types of investor satisfy the following HJB equations
rV dh1,t =V˙
d
h1,t + ξ
(
V dl1,t − V dh1,t
)
+ η
(
p+ V dh0,t − V dh1,t
)
+ c, (2.4)
rV dl1,t =V˙
d
l1,t + max
{
0, ρdst
(
V dl0,t − V dl1,t +Bdt
)
− χds
}
+ η
(
p+ V dl0,t − V dl1,t
)
+ c− δ, (2.5)
V dl0,t =0. (2.6)
Intuitively, equation (2.4) reflects that high valuation owners receive the coupon c until
they are hit by a liquidity shock, which occurs at rate ξ, or until the asset matures, which
occurs at rate η. Equation (2.5) shows that, once hit by a liquidity shock, investors receive
a reduced utility flow c − δ from owning the asset and choose between becoming active
sellers or staying out of the market. Note that the measure st of active seller is bounded
above by the measure of low-valuation owners, st ∈
[
0, µdl1,t
]
. Equation (2.6) reflects that
low-valuation investors leave the market forever once they liquidate their holdings. For
future reference, let ∆V ki,t ≡ V ki1,t − V ki0,t denote the reservation value of type i ∈ {h, l} in
market structure k ∈ {c, d}, and let ∆kh,l ≡ ∆V kh,t −∆V kl,t denote the total surplus a trade
generates.
The value function of market makers in a decentralized market must satisfy
rV dm,t =V˙
d
m,t + max
{
0, ρdmt
(
Adt −Bdt
)
− χdm
}
, (2.7)
which implies that market makers choose to intermediate trades whenever the rate at which
they complete transactions ρdmt times the spread they earn in the process
(
Adt −Bdt
)
is large
enough to compensate them for the cost χdm they incur. The zero-profit condition of market
makers is ρdmt
(
Adt −Bdt
) ≤ χdm, with equality whenever mt > 0.
Active market makers do not publicly commit to firm quotes, they instead negotiate the
price with investors when they are contacted. At the outcome of the bargaining process,
buyers obtain a share θb of the surplus, market makers a share θm, and sellers a share θs,
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with the restriction that θb + θm + θs = 1. The resulting ask and bid prices are
Adt = (1− θb) ∆V dh,t + θb∆V dl,t, (2.8)
Bdt = (1− θs) ∆V dl,t + θs∆V dh,t, (2.9)
which implies that the market maker commission is indeed a share θm of the surplus, A
d −
Bd = θm∆
d
hl. We now define and characterize a competitive equilibrium in a decentralized
market structure.
Definition 1. Given an initial asset allocation,
{
µdl1,0, µ
d
h1,0
}
, a decentralized equilibrium
is a list composed of asset allocation processes,
{
µdl1,t, µ
d
h1,t
}
t≥0
; processes for the measu-
res of buyers, market makers, and sellers {bt,mt, st}t≥0; a collection of value functions,{
V dh0,t, V
d
h1,t, V
d
l1,t, V
d
l0,t, V
d
m,t
}
t≥0
; and processes for the bid and ask prices,
{
Bdt , A
d
t
}
t≥0, sa-
tisfying (2.1)–(2.9) for all t ≥ 0.
Let’s first note that an inactive market, where bt = mt = st = 0 for all t ≥ 0, can always be
supported in equilibrium. It is not optimal for buyers and market makers to participate if
sellers stay out of the market; it is not optimal for sellers to participate if buyers or market
makers stay out of the market. Such a self fulling equilibrium equilibrium is sustainable
for all parameter values, and its characterization is trivial. For an equilibrium with active
market to exists, the following condition must be satisfied
δ
r + η + ξ
≥ 1
gd
(
θb
χdb
, θm
χdm
, θs
χds
) . (2.10)
I show in the Appendix that this condition ensures that low valuation owners have sufficient
incentive to participate in the market given the costs involved. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Provided that condition (2.10) is satisfied, there exists an equilibrium with
the following properties. All type l1 investors participate in the market, st = µ
d
l1,t for all
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t ≥ 0. The surplus is constant, ∆dhl,t = ∆dhl, and given by the unique positive solution to
(r + η + ξ) ∆dhl + χ
d
s
[
gd
(
θb
χdb
,
θm
χdm
,
θs
χds
)
∆dhl
] 1
1−αd−βd
= δ + χds . (2.11)
The buyer-to-seller ratio and market maker-to-seller ratio are constant over time, which in
turn implies that execution rates are constant as well, ρdφt = ρ
d
φ for all φ ∈ {b,m, s}. The
bid and ask prices are also constant, Adt = A
d and Bdt = B
d, and satisfy
Ad =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r + η
+ θb
)
∆dhl,
Bd =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r + η
+ θb + θd
)
∆dhl,
and the bid-ask spread is Sd = Ad − Bd = θm∆dhl. The equilibrium measure of type-l1
investor as a function of time is
µdl1,t =
(
µdl1,0 −
ξx
ξ + ρds
)
e−(ξ+ρ
d
s)t +
ξx
ξ + ρds
, (2.12)
thus the steady state level of misallocated asset is µdl1,∞ =
ξx
ξ+ρds
.
The fact that execution rates are constant over time is a direct consequence of free entry
and a constant return to scale trading technology. The prices are equal to the present
value of the coupon and principal, cr+η +
ηp
r+η , minus a liquidity discount. The discount
is function of the frequency at which investor require liquidity, ξ; the bargaining power of
the participants, θb and θd; and the difference between buyer and seller reservation values,
∆dhl, which summarizes the severity of the trading frictions. Intuitively, following a liquidity
shock, an owner’s subjective valuation decrease by more when selling the asset is difficult.
The comparative statics of the model are intuitive. The surplus ∆dhl is increasing in the
holding cost δ and in the participation costs χdb , χ
d
m, and χ
d
s ; but decreasing in the efficiency
of the trade execution technology λ: following a liquidity shock, an owner’s subjective
valuation of the asset decrease by more when the holding cost is high, when participation in
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the market is costly, and when the trade execution technology is less efficient. The surplus
is decreasing in ξ and η since the gain from trade is lower when buyers are hit by liquidity
shocks at a higher rate, and when the asset is expected to mature in the near future. The
comparative statics on bargaining powers and the shares of the order processing function
are ambiguous. These results were obtained by implicitly differentiating equation (2.11).
Equation (2.12) implies that, in steady state, the measure of misallocated asset increases
with the frequency at which liquidity shocks occur, ξ, and decreases with the speed at which
seller trade, ρds .
I conclude this section by defining and characterizing the social welfare of this economy.
In this risk-neutral framework, social welfare is the present value of the bond payoff net of
holding costs and participation costs,
W d = Eτ
[∫ τ
0
e−rt
(
xc− δµdl1,t − χdbbt − χdmmt − χdsst
)
dt+ e−rτxp
]
, (2.13)
where τ ∼ exp (η) corresponds the time at which the bond matures. Using the results in
Proposition 1, this integral can be calculated explicitly
W d = W ∗ −
(
µdl1,0 +
ξx
r + η
)
∆dhl, (2.14)
where W ∗ = xcr+η +
ηxp
r+η corresponds to the welfare achieved in a frictionless economy.
Thus the welfare loss associated with an OTC market structure, W ∗ −W d, is composed
of two terms: the first one, µdl1,0∆
d
hl, accounts for the initial misallocation of the asset; the
second one, ξxr+η∆
d
hl, is the discounted value of all future utility lost to trading frictions.
For both terms, the magnitude of the welfare loss is proportional to the surplus ∆dhl. In-
terestingly, most of the model’s parameters do not explicitly enter the welfare expression.
To quantify the welfare loss caused by trading frictions, it is sufficient to measure the diffe-
rence in subjective valuation between buyers and sellers; individually estimating the deep
structural parameters that generates these frictions is not necessary. In other words, the
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total surplus is a sufficient statistic for the impact of trading frictions on welfare.
2.2.4. Centralized Equilibrium
In the centralized market structure, market makers compete for order flow by posting firm
bid and ask quotations on central limit order books (CLOB). There are potentially several
CLOB, or market centers, in operation. Each market center publicly states a contract
σt = (At, Bt) that specifies the ask price At and the bid price Bt at which it will accept
limit orders from market makers. Denote by Σt = R+ × R+ the set of feasible contracts
at time t and by Σ∗t the set of contracts active in equilibrium at time t – i.e., the set of
contracts where at least some market makers send limit orders. Investors observe the set of
active contracts and decide at which venue to send their market orders.
Denote the measures of active buyers, market markers, and sellers on a contract σt ∈ Σt
by bt (σt), mt (σt), and st (σt), respectively. Correspondingly, denote the aggregate trade
execution rate for this contract by gct (σt) ≡ gct (bt (σt) ,mt (σt) , st (σt)), such that the exe-
cution rates experienced by market participants are ρcφt (σt) =
gct (σt)
φt(σt)
, where φ ∈ {b,m, s}.
The value function of a potential buyer must then satisfy
rV ch0,t = V˙
c
h0,t + max
σt∈Σ∗t
{
0, ρcbt (σt)
(
V ch1,t − V ch0,t −At
)− χcb}+ ξ (V cl0,t − V ch0,t) . (2.15)
This equation implies that investors send their orders to the contract that delivers the
highest utility flow, provided that this flow is weakly positive. The zero utility condition
of buyers implies that ρcbt (σt)
(
V ch1,t − V ch0,t −At
)
= χcb for all σt ∈ Σ∗t . Similarly, the value
functions of the other types of investor satisfy
rV ch1,t =V˙
c
h1,t + ξ
(
V cl1,t − V ch1,t
)
+ η
(
p+ V ch0,t − V ch1,t
)
+ c, (2.16)
rV cl1,t =V˙
c
l1,t + max
σt∈Σ∗t
{
0, ρcst (σt)
(
V cl0,t − V cl1,t +Bt
)− χcs}+ η (p+ V cl0,t − V cl1,t)+ c− δ,
(2.17)
V cl0,t =0, (2.18)
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and the value function of market makers satisfies
rV cm,t =V˙
c
m,t + max
σt∈Σ∗t
{
0, ρcmt (σt) (At −Bt)− χcm
}
. (2.19)
Market maker’s zero-profit condition implies that ρcmt (σt) (At −Bt) = χcm for all σt ∈ Σ∗t .
Following Moen (1997), the equilibrium allocation is required to be a no-surplus allocation.
Assuming there is active trading, the set of contracts offered in equilibrium must maximize
low valuation owners utility subject to the participation constraint of buyers and market
makers
Σ∗t ⊇argmax
σt∈Σt
ρcst (σt)
(
V cl0,t − V cl1,t +Bt
)
subject to ρcbt (σt)
(
V ch1,t − V ch0,t −At
)
= χcb,
ρcmt (σt) (At −Bt) = χcm.
(2.20)
If such a contract was not offered in equilibrium, a market center could propose the va-
lue maximizing contract and require a participation fee from sellers. For a small enough
participation fee, the market center would manage to attract sellers, and generate profit.
Competition among market centers bid this fee down to zero. We now define and characte-
rize a competitive equilibrium on a centralized market structure.
Definition 2. Given an initial asset allocation,
{
µcl1,0, µ
c
h1,0
}
, a centralized equilibrium
is a list composed of asset allocation processes,
{
µcl1,t, µ
c
h1,t
}
t≥0
; a collection of contracts,
{Σ∗t }t≥0; processes for the measures of buyers, market makers, and sellers in each active
contract, {bt (σt) ,mt (σt) , st (σt)}t≥0 for each σt ∈ Σ∗t ; and a collection of value functions,{
V ch0,t, V
c
h1,t, V
c
l1,t, V
c
l0,t, V
c
m,t
}
t≥0
satisfying (2.1)–(2.2), and (2.15)–(2.20) for all t ≥ 0.
As in the decentralized framework, an equilibrium where the centralized market is inactive
exists for all parameter values. For an active market equilibrium to exists, the following
condition must be satisfied
δ
r + η + ξ
≥ 1
gc
(
αc
χcb
, β
c
χcm
, 1−α
c−βc
χcs
) . (2.21)
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This condition is analogous to the condition we obtained in the decentralized market, with
the exception that the bargaining power parameters in equation (2.10) have been substituted
for the shares of the matching function. I expand on the reason for this similarity below.
The following proposition characterize the active market equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Provided that condition (2.21) is satisfied, there exists an equilibrium
with the following properties. A single time invariant contract is offered, Σ∗t = {σ∗} =
{(Ac, Bc)}. All type l1 investors direct their order flow toward that contract, st (σ∗) = µcl1,t
for all t ≥ 0. The total surplus is constant, ∆chl,t = ∆chl, and given by the unique positive
solution to
(r + η + ξ) ∆chl,t + χ
c
s
[
gc
(
αc
χcb
,
βc
χcm
,
1− αc − βc
χcs
)
∆chl,t
] 1
1−αc−βc
= δ + χcs. (2.22)
The buyer-to-seller ratio and the market marker-to-seller ratio are constant, which implies
that the trade execution rates are constant as well, ρcφt (σ
∗) = ρcφ for each φ ∈ {b,m, s}. The
bid and ask prices satisfy
Ac =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r
+ αc
)
∆chl,
Bc =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r
+ αc + βc
)
∆chl,
which implies that the bid-ask spread is Sc = Ac−Bc = βc∆chl. The equilibrium measure of
type l1 investor as a function of time is
µcl1,t =
(
µcl1,0 −
ξx
ξ + ρcs
)
e−(ξ+ρ
c
s)t +
ξx
ξ + ρcs
, (2.23)
thus the steady state level of misallocated asset is µcl1,∞ =
ξx
ξ+ρcs
.
I show in the Appendix that there is a unique contract that maximizes low valuation owners
utility. This contract is the only one offered in equilibrium since any other contract would
fail to attract seller’s order flow. The remainder of Proposition 2 mirrors Proposition
1 with the difference that the bargaining power parameters have been substituted for the
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corresponding shares of the matching function. This is because, in the centralized venue, the
shares of the matching function endogenously determine surplus allocation among market
participants. For example, market maker commission in the decentralized market structure
is Sd = θd∆
d
hl while their commission is S
c = βc∆chl in the centralized market structure.
The fact that the share of the matching function determines the surplus allocation among
market participants is a standard result of the directed search literature, see Moen (1997)
and Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015) for examples.
Welfare in the centralized market structure is defined in a similar way as in the decentralized
market structure. A direct calculation shows that
W c = W ∗ −
(
µcl1,0 +
ξx
r + η
)
∆chl (2.24)
where here again W ∗ = xcr+η +
ηxp
r+η corresponds to the welfare achieved in a frictionless
economy. This expression is analoguous to the one we obtained for the decentralized venue.
With these results on hand, we can now discuss the relative efficiency of the two market
structures.
2.2.5. Relative Efficiency
To simplify the exposition, I assume throughout the rest of the paper that µdl1,0 = µ
c
l1,0 = 0.
A natural interpretation of this assumption is that when the asset is initially offered to
the public at t = 0, only high valuation investors purchase it. Given this assumption, the
difference in efficiency between the centralized and decentralized market structure is
W c −W d = ξx
r + η
(
∆dhl −∆chl
)
. (2.25)
This equation implies that the optimal market structure is the one associated with the
lowest total surplus ∆hl. This is intuitive since we saw earlier that the difference in valuation
between buyers and sellers summarizes the severity of the trading frictions on either market
structure. The multiplicative factor ξxr+η magnifies the social benefit of trading on the
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optimal venue. While the welfare expression is simple and intuitive, the surpluses are not
directly measurable and must be inferred from observable quantities.
In Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we established that transaction costs on the decentra-
lized and centralized venues are Sd = θm∆hl and S
c = βc∆hl, respectively. Substituting
these expressions back in 2.25 yields
W c −W d = ξx
r + η
(
Sd
θm
− S
c
βc
)
. (2.26)
The formula shows that, while transaction costs are informative about the relative efficiency
of the two market structures, they must be appropriately scaled by the share of surplus that
market makers earn on the venues in order to study welfare. The next section maps the
welfare expression to data.
2.3. Welfare Analysis
Equation (2.26) highlights that the sign of the term in parenthesis, S
d
θm
− Scβc , determines the
optimal market structure. The transaction costs of OTC traded corporate bonds, Sd, can
directly be measured in the data. In Section 1.4, we constructed counterfactual estimates of
the transaction costs that bonds would have on limit order markets, Sc. Hence we are left to
estimate the parameters θm and β
c. To evaluate the magnitude of the welfare gain or loss,
we must also estimate the frequency of investor liquidity needs ξ. The other parameters are
directly measurable: x is the total supply of asset, r is the risk-free rate, and 1η is the time
to maturity.
2.3.1. Estimation of θm
I estimate the bargaining power parameter by matching the liquidity premium of corporate
bonds reported in Cui et al. (2018). Assuming that buyers and sellers have a similar amount
of bargaining power when negotiating with dealers, we have from Proposition 1 that the
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liquidity premium φd is given by
φd = P ∗ −Md =
(
1
2
+
ξ
r + η
)
Ad −Bd
θm
,
Table 2.1 reports the fit of the model. The bargaining power estimate is θˆm = 0.73.
2.3.2. Estimation of βc
I estimate the coefficient βc that applies to US stocks using data on trading volume and
book depth. I then show that, in Israel, the estimate for bonds is of the same magnitude as
the one for stocks. As a result, the estimate for US stocks is used in the welfare calculations.
Recall that the coefficient βc is the market maker’s share in the matching function,
gct = g
c (bt,mt, st) = λ
cbα
c
t m
βc
t s
1−αc−βc
t ,
where mt is the measure of active market makers. Since each market maker posts limit
orders to buy and sell exactly one unit of the asset, mt also corresponds to the quantity of
asset available at the bid and ask, also known as the depth of the book. The quantity gct
corresponds to trading volume at time t. Thus we have that
∂Volumet
∂Deptht
=
∂ log gct
∂ logmt
= βc.
Hence βc is equal to the elasticity of trading volume with respect to the the depth of the
book. For a given security i, I estimate βci by regressing daily trading volume on the
average depth of the book during the day. Since the time series of volume and depth are
non stationary (both increase over time over the sample period), I first difference the data
∆ log Volumei,t = β
c
i∆ log Depthi,t + i,t
From this exercise, I obtain individual estimates βˆci for all modern US stocks, and for all
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Israeli bonds and stocks. I estimate βc as the cross-sectional average of the security level
estimates
βˆc =
1
N
N∑
i=1
βˆci . (2.27)
Table 2.2 reports the estimates for US stocks, and Israeli bonds and stocks, separately. In
Israel, the estimates are 0.65 for stocks, and 0.60 for bonds. The difference between the
two estimates, 0.05, is significant at the 10% level. This difference is potentially caused by
the minimum order amount rule of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The minimum order size
is 2,000NIS for stocks and 10,000 for bonds.2 Such constraints make the order flow more
lumpy, which might mute the response of volume to change in book depth.
For US stocks, the estimate is 0.45. The smaller US estimate is probably related to the fact
that a larger fraction of trading in US equities is done off exchange (9% in Israel versus
33% in the US). Hence we should expect volume to be less sensitive to book depth in the
US. Since the estimates for bonds and stocks are close to each other in the Israeli sample,
I assume that the estimate βc obtained for US equities would also hold for bonds when I
estimate the welfare implications of centralizing corporate bond trading.
2.3.3. Estimation of ξ
The last parameter to estimate is the frequency of liquidity shocks, ξ. Intuitively, the value
of this parameter should be tied to the frequency at which the asset is traded. In steady
state, the annual turnover of the asset, T =
∫ t+1
t g
k
s ds
x , is given by
T =
ρksξ
ρks + ξ
=
ξ
1 + ξ
ρks
≤ ξ. (2.28)
2See Abudy and Wohl (2017) for an in depth discussion of the institutional details of the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange.
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Hence the asset’s turnover, measured on either market structures, provides a lower bound
on the liquidity needs of investors. Provided that S
d
θm
> S
c
βc , this inequality implies that
W c −W d ≥ Tx
r + η
(
Sd
θm
− S
c
βc
)
. (2.29)
When instead S
d
θm
< S
c
βc , the opposite inequality holds. In the welfare calculations below, I
substitute the parameter ξ for the bond’s turnover.
2.3.4. Welfare Calculations
In this section, we analyze the welfare implications of centralizing the corporate bond market
structure in the cross section of bonds. For each bond i, I calculate the quantity
∆Wi =
Tixi
r + ηi
(
Sdi
θˆm
− S
c
i
βˆc
)
,
where Ti is the bond’s turnover, xi is number of bond outstanding, r = 0.02 is the risk-free
rate, 1ηi is the time to maturity at issuance, S
d
i is the OTC transaction cost, S
c
i is the
equity-implied transaction cost estimate, θˆm = 0.73 is the estimate of dealer bargaining
power in OTC markets, and βˆc = 0.45 is the estimate of the market maker share in the
matching function on the centralized venue. Table 2.3 reports the estimates across credit
ratings.
The cross sectional differences in the benefit of centralizing the market structure echoes the
findings of Section 1.4 where we showed that lower credit rated bonds would experience
larger decline in transaction costs. In terms of magnitude, the welfare gains correspond to
14 bps of the par value of Aaa/Aa rated bonds and 29 bps of the total par value of Ba rated
bonds.
2.4. Conclusion
This paper showed that moving corporate bond trading to a centralized market structure
would generate large benefits. On average, effective spreads would decrease by 70% while
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quoted spread would decrease by 77%. Over the life of the average bond, this implies
transaction cost savings equal to 0.66% of the bond total par value. Based on the insights
of a new model of centralized and decentralized trading, I find that moving to a limit order
market would generate welfare gains equal to 21 bps of total par value for the average bond.
Larger bond issues, with lower credit ratings and longer time to maturity would benefit the
most from a centralized market structure. The results have obvious policy implications.
Future research could use the methodological framework develop in this paper to evaluate
if other OTC markets would benefit from moving to centralized venues.
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Table 2.1: Fit of the Liquidity Premium
Aaa/Aa A Baa Ba
A−B (bps) 14 15 17 19
ξ (%) 31 32 37 41
η (year) 7.4 7.3 7.8 7.3
Liquidity premium (bps)
target 50 57 67 83
model 51 53 72 80
r=2%
This table reports the model fit of the liquidity premium for a value of θm = 0.73 across various credit ratings.
Definition for the model-implied liquidity premium can be found in the model section of the paper.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of βc
βˆc SE
Israel
stocks 0.65 0.02
bonds 0.60 0.02
diff 0.05∗ 0.03
US
stocks 0.45 0.01
This table reports the estimate of the structural parameter βc following the procedure outlined in Section 2.3. The
columns labeled ”Estimate” contains the point estimate of the parameters. Standard errors are reported in the column
SE. The row diff reports the results of a difference in means test between Israeli bonds and stocks. The standard error
of the test is calculated using Satterthwaite’s approximation. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Welfare Analysis
Aaa/Aa A Baa Ba
A−B (bps)
decentralized 14 15 17 20
centralized 5 6 6.5 7
difference 9 9 10.5 13
liquidity premium (bps)
decentralized 51 53 72 80
centralized 34 36 44 45
difference 17 17 28 35
Welfare change (bps total par) 14 13 23 29
This table reports the summary statistics of the liquidity measures as well as the welfare analysis per credit ratings.
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APPENDIX
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Investor’s and market maker’s Bellman equations make clear that at each point in time,
two outcomes are possible: either the market is active and the measures bt, dt, and st are
all strictly positive, or the market is inactive bt = dt = st = 0. Let’s conjecture that the
former outcome holds for all t ≥ 0. This implies that the zero-profit condition of market
makers and zero-utility condition of buyers hold with equality at all times. Substituting
in these two conditions the expressions for the bid and ask prices from (2.8) and (2.9), we
obtain
ρdbtθb∆
d
hl,t = χ
d
b , (A.1)
ρdmtθm∆
d
hl,t = χ
d
m, (A.2)
for all t ∈ [0,∞). Manipulating (A.1) and (A.2), we solve for the buyer-to-seller ratio and
the market maker-to-seller ratio
bt
st
=
[
λd
(
θb
χdb
)1−βd ( θm
χdm
)βd
∆dhl,t
] 1
1−αd−βd
, (A.3)
dt
st
=
[
λd
(
θb
χdb
)αd ( θm
χdm
)1−αd
∆dhl,t
] 1
1−αd−βd
. (A.4)
Substituting the prices (2.8) and (2.9), as well as the ratios (A.3) and (A.4) back into the
investor’s HJB equations (2.3)–2.6 shows after manipulation that the surplus must satisfy
∆˙dhl,t = f
d
(
∆dhl,t
)
, where
fd
(
∆dhl,t
)
= (r + η + ξ) ∆dhl,t + θs
[
λd
(
θb
χdb
)αd ( θm
χdm
)βd
∆dhl,t
] 1
1−αd−βd
−
(
δ + χds
)
.
(A.5)
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Since this equation doesn’t explicitly depends on time, we conjecture that ∆dhl,t = ∆
d
hl.
Under this conjecture, the gain from trade must solve fd
(
∆dhl
)
= 0, which clearly has a
unique positive solution.
We now characterize the condition under which our initial conjecture that an active market
exists holds. Substituting the expression of the bid price back into the HJB equation of
type l1 reveals that low valuation owners become active sellers if and only if ρdsθs∆
d
hl ≥ χs
(assuming that seller participate when they are indifferent between participating and staying
out of the market). This condition is verified if and only if f
(
χds
ρdsθs
)
≤ 0. A direct calculation
shows that this condition is equivalent to
δ
r + ξ
≥ 1
gd
(
θb
χdb
, θm
χdm
, θs
χdm
) .
When this condition is satisfied, all low-valuation investors become active in the market,
such that st = µ
d
l1,t. Solving the values function in terms of the gain from trade yields
V dh0,t = V
d
l0,t = V
d
d,t = 0,
V dh1,t =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r + η
)
∆dhd,
V dl1,t =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
1 +
ξ
r + η
)
∆dhd.
The bid and ask prices are then
Adt =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r + η
+ θb
)
∆dhl,
Bdt =
c
r + η
+
ηp
r + η
−
(
ξ
r + η
+ θb + θd
)
∆dhl,
The trade execution function can be written as gdt = ρ
d
sµ
d
l1,t, and the law of motion for the
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measure of type-l1 investor written as
µ˙dl1,t = −ρdsµdl1,t + ξ
(
x− µdl1,t
)
.
Solving the ODE yields
µdl1,t =
(
µdl1,0 −
ξρds
ξ + ρds
)
e−(ξ+ρ
d
s)t +
ξρds
ξ + ρds
.
A2. Proof of proposition 2
Assuming that a contract σt is active for all t ≥ 0, the zero-profit condition of market
makers and the zero-utility condition of buyers for that contract must hold with equality
ρcbt (σt)
(
V ch1,t − V ch0,t −At
)
= χcb, (A.6)
ρcmt (σt) (At −Bt) = χcm. (A.7)
Substituting these two conditions back into the no-surplus condition (2.20), taking the FOC
and solving for the buyer-to-seller and market maker-to-seller ratios yields
bt
st
=
[
λc
(
αc
χcb
)1−βc ( βc
χcm
)βc
∆chl,t
] 1
1−αc−βc
, (A.8)
dt
st
=
[
λc
(
αc
χcb
)αc ( βc
χcm
)1−αc
∆chl,t
] 1
1−αc−βc
. (A.9)
Substituting these ratios back into the free entry conditions reveals that
V ch1,t − V ch0,t −At = αc∆hl,t, (A.10)
At −Bt = βc∆hl,t, (A.11)
V cl0,t − V cl1,t +Bt = (1− αc − βc) ∆chl,t. (A.12)
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Substituting the buyer-to-seller and market maker-to-seller ratios back into the investor
HJB shows after manipulation that the gain from trade must satisfy ∆˙chl,t = f
c
(
∆chl,t
)
where
f c
(
∆chl,t
)
= (r + η + ξ) ∆chl,t + (1− αc − βc)
[
λc
(
αc
χcb
)αc ( βc
χcm
)βc
∆chl,t
] 1
1−αc−βc
− (δ + χcs) .
(A.13)
Following from there the steps we followed in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain the
remaining results of Proposition 2.
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